Hira Bahadur Thapa

With North Korea’s March 25 test of two short-range ballistic missiles, the issue of reversing Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuits has again captured the global attention. Analysts view this action as a first sign of provocation to the Joe Biden administration. The US President has pledged to keep door open to diplomacy for dealing with North Korea. He has simultaneously warned of suitable responses if Pyongyang continues perfecting the nuclear weapons technology unabated.
Kim Jong-un had three summits with the then President Donald Trump on North Korea’s denuclearisation in 2018 and 2019, which yielded no results. The nuclear experts opine that the aim of denuclearisation was highly ambitious given North Korean leader’s conviction that nuclear weapons can only deter attacks from the country’s adversaries. Technically, the US and North Korea are still at war. In 1950, America fought against North Korea on behalf of South Korea and three year-long Korean War ended with UN-assisted armistice but with no formal peace agreement. North Korea is deeply suspicious of US intentions of seeing the Korean Peninsula denuclearised.

Trust deficit
There is absence of trust between the US and North Korea. During the period when President Trump decided to hold direct talks with Kim Jong-un on the issue of denuclearisation, few were optimistic that North Korea would concede to the US demands. Their pessimism was understandable given the fact that previous American administrations since the 1990s have failed to persuade North Korea to forsake its nuclear weapons.
Before the launch of ballistic missiles, an action that contravenes the UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting missiles tests by North Korea, its leader had issued warnings that the US would pay a price accusing the latter of raising a stink on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea characterised the recent efforts of Washington to open a channel of communication as a trick. Sounding defiant, it vowed to deal with the US “power for power.”
Emboldened by the failure of Trump administration’s summitry with regard to constraining North Korea’s nuclear ambitions the country is continuing to produce nuclear weapons at a rapid rate. Although estimates in this connection vary, but the country produces sufficient fissile materials to make 12 new weapons per year or could have enough for a total of 60 weapons or more.
The latest ballistic missiles launch is a credible proof of North Korea’s continuing efforts to advance its nuclear weapons technology. Duyeou Kim of the Centre for New American Security believes that these missiles are apparently an improved variant of the Russian Iskander-style short-range ballistic missiles launched in 2019. The likely implications of new delivery weapons include the possibilities that the missiles could be tipped with nuclear, biological or, chemical warheads. Missiles could hold South Korea hostage or target South Korea and Americans living there. North Korea, should escalation be upped, could use them in a conflict with South Korea and the US.
Furthermore, these missiles fly at low trajectories and have jet vanes, which mean they are designed to challenge ballistic missile defenses and can be maneuvered in flight. Their maneuverability makes it harder for the US and South Korea to intercept them in flight, even through their military authorities each claim they possess intercept capabilities. The mobility of these missiles could also confound existing US and South Korean intelligence capabilities that are otherwise said to be able to determine the type of warhead inside a missile identifying its original storage location. The warheads of these missiles can be nuclear or conventional.
How the Biden administration will respond to North Korea’s is conditioned on its policy review of the country which is being finalized. North Korea uses weapon tests strategically, both to make needed improvements to its weapons and attract international attention.
Judged against this analysis the US is hoping China to be cooperative in its attempts to pursue diplomacy to persuade North Korea to negotiate on the weapons issue. The US and China hold similar views on North Korea’s disarmament, their strategic competition, nevertheless. This has been illustrated by the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. He said, “Beijing has an interest in helping to pursue the denuclearisation of North Korea because it is a source of instability.”

China’s role
China prefers to strike a balance vis-à-vis North Korea. It neither wants North Korea to collapse nor provoke the US to bolster its military presence on the Korean Peninsula. China believes that not assisting in multilateral initiatives intended to constrain North Korea’s nuclear intentions may push the US to be more involved militarily. Any expanded US role in the region sits at odds with China’s national interests. This is why China vetoed in all three UN Security Council resolutions on punishing North Korea in 2017.
China has also declared in 2006 that North Korea is not its ally despite Sino-North Korea Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has categorised China-North Korea relationship as “normal state-to-state relations.” China did not condemn the March 25 missile tests but expectedly called on all parties concerned to work together to maintain the situation of détente and promote political settlement of the peninsular issue through dialogue and consultation.
Nuclearised North Korea is not in anyone’s interests, and Beijing is no exception. Washington while concluding policy review on North Korea should not overlook potential for future diplomacy. Pressure tactics through sanctions have been counterproductive so far in curbing North Korea’s nuclear weapons advancement. Diplomacy needs to be given a chance for reducing nuclear risks.

(Thapa was Foreign Relations Advisor to the Prime Minister from 2008-09. thapahira17@gmail.com)